Insider insights on regional security and Great Power Competition on the geopolitical chessboard of the Middle East and the Eastern Mediterranean.

If the free world tries to impose a Palestinian state upon Israel in these circumstances, Israel will be forced to fight for its survival against it. Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood, who seek to destroy Israel, will not stop their aggression if they somehow succeed in their goals. In fact, they will get much closer than ever to their objective of destroying the West and building their sought-after global caliphate on its ruins.

By striking Hamas leaders in Doha, Israel crossed a threshold that will reshape the power and diplomacy dynamics in the Middle East. For decades, Qatar positioned itself as both a U.S. ally and a supporter of Hamas. It housed the group’s leadership, financed its operations, and used Al-Jazeera’s platform to spin Hamas’s terrorism into “resistance” or a “struggle for freedom.” However, it also aimed for Western approval by acting as a mediator, hosting peace talks, and portray

Unlike the rigid and limited scope of traditional jihadism, neo-Jihadism emphasizes strategic adaptation and long-term objectives that are global rather than local, making it both more insidious and more dangerous than all other forms of political Islamism and Salafi-Jihadism the world has known so far. We are already seeing some Arab and Western leaders falling for al-Sharaa’s rhetoric, mistakenly believing that he offers a better alternative to the existing jihadist and pol

f the international community continues to underestimate the threat posed by actors like Al-Sharaa, it will soon find itself dealing with a problem that no longer stops at the borders of Syria or even the Middle East. Israel’s presence and military resolve may be the last line of defense. The rest of the region, and the West, must decide whether to stand firm alongside it or sleepwalk into the next jihadist nightmare.

Israel’s frustrations and concerns over Egypt’s flawed policies in Gaza after October 7 are completely understandable. The bond of trust built between Egypt and Israel over the past decade, especially since President Sisi took office in 2014, has been severely strained by Cairo’s subsequent poorly thought-out policy responses to the October 7 attacks. Egypt’s vocal criticism of the deeply wounded Israel, perceived sympathy for Hamas terrorism, and rapid troop buildup near Raf

Nuclear diplomacy with Iran may be necessary. But if pursued without carefully managing Arab perceptions and Israel’s insecurities, it risks unintentionally accelerating a new Cold War in the Middle East, one where the U.S. is neither feared nor fully trusted and where its allies are quietly building alternatives.